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OPINION
GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. In this class action suit, defendant City of Columbus, 
Ohio (“the City”), appeals the district court’s order granting in part and denying in part 
plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, denying defendant’s summary 
judgment motion, and granting plaintiffs’ request for permanent injunctive relief. The 
plaintiffs consist of two certified classes, all of whom are current or former employees 
of the City of Columbus, Division of Police. Plaintiffs initiated the present action in 
December 2007 alleging that, as employees, they were subject to certain impermissible 
city Division Directives that mandate the procedures governing their return to regular 
duty following sick leave, injury leave, or restricted duty.
At issue in the present appeal is Directive 3.07 § III(H)(1)(c) (“the Directive”), 
which requires returning employees to submit a copy of their physician’s note, stating 
the “nature of the illness” and whether the employee is capable of returning to regular 
duty, “to your immediate supervisor.” Upset by the mandatory disclosure and funneling 
of confidential medical information through immediate supervisors, plaintiffs asserted 
class claims, alleging that the Directive violates the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791 
etseq, and the privacy provisions of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on both claims and entered a permanent 
injunction prohibiting the City from enforcing Directive 3.07 § III(H)(1)(c). For the
1
The individually named plaintiffs also asserted various claims for relief in their individual 
capacities under these federal statutes, as well as under the Family Medical Leave Act, the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, and Ohio law. These individual claims are not at issue in the present appeal, which 
involves only the plaintiffs as certified classes.
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reasons that follow, we vacate the injunction and reverse and remand for the entry of 
judgment in the City’s favor.
I.
The facts of this case are accurately set forth in the district court’s decision:
This case was brought by several employees of the City of Columbus, 
Division of Police. Plaintiffs allege that Columbus Police Division 
Directive (“Directive”) 3.07 § 111(H)(1)(c) violates the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 790 etseq. (“Rehabilitation Act”) and the privacy 
provisions of the First, Fifth and Fourteen Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 
1983”). Plaintiffs request a permanent injunction prohibiting 
enforcement of Directive 3.07 § III(1)(c) and Plaintiffs request damages 
for alleged harm caused to them by the enforcement of that Directive [].
Directive 3.07 § III(H) relates to the procedures for when an employee 
seeks to take sick leave prior to the start of his or her shift and provides 
in relevant part:
H. Returning to Regular Duty Following Sick Leave, Injury Leave, 
or Restricted Duty
I. All Personnel
a. Notify the Information Desk to mark up prior to returning to 
regular duty.
b. If any of the following conditions apply, forward a note from the 
attending physician to [the Employee Benefits Unit] upon 
returning to regular duty:
(1) More than three days of sick leave were used.
The physician’s note must state the nature of the illness and that 
you are capable of returning to regular duty.
(2) Previously notified by a commander to do so.
The physician’s note must state the nature of the illness and that 
you are capable of returning to regular duty.
(3) More than two days of sick leave were used due to illness in the 
immediate family.
The physician’s note must state the nature of the family 
member’s illness and that you were required to care for the 
family member.
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Note: Consult the applicable work agreement for the definition of 
immediate family.
(4) You were assigned to restricted duty.
The physician’s note must state that you are capable of returning 
to regular duty.
c. Submit a copy of the physician’s note to your immediate supervisor.
Under these provisions, an employee who is returning to regular duty 
must under specified circumstances provide a note from his or her 
attending physician to his or her immediate supervisor. The physician’s 
note must state the nature of the illness and that the employee is capable 
of returning to regular duty if the employee was off for more than three 
days of sick leave or was previously notified by a commander to do so. 
Directive 3.07 § III(H)(1)(b)(1), (2). If more than two days of sick leave 
were used due to illness in the immediate family, then the physician’s 
note must state the nature of the family member’s illness and that the 
employee was required to care for the family member. Directive 3.07 
§ III(h)(1)(b)(3). In all instances, the Directive requires the employee to 
submit a copy of the physician’s note to his or her immediate supervisor. 
Directive 3.07 § III(H)(1)(c).
Two of the individually named Plaintiffs, Carrie Best and Cheri 
Bowman, moved this Court for preliminary injunctive relief against 
enforcement of Directive 3.07(H)(1)(c) against them. That motion was 
fully briefed and on June 24, 2008, this Court granted these two 
Plaintiffs’ motion and issued a preliminary injunction, holding that Best 
and Bowman were substantially likely to succeed on the merits of their 
Rehabilitation Act claim and their constitutional challenges to Directive 
3.07(h)(1)(c).
On May 21, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify two plaintiff classes.
That motion was fully briefed and on August 22, 2008, this Court granted 
class certification. Defendants subsequently filed a motion to modify the 
definition of one of the classes, which this Court granted. The classes are 
defined as follows:
CLASS I
All employees of the City of Columbus, Division of Police, subject to the 
enforcement of Division Directive 3.07, who, since December 4, 2005 
through present, pursuant to the Directive, have been required to disclose 
confidential medical information to supervisory personnel.
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CLASS II
All current employees of the City of Columbus, Division of Police, 
subject to the enforcement of Division Directive 3.07.
On September 9, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting that the 
preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of Directive 3.07 
§ III(H)(1)(c) against [two individual plaintiffs] be extended to the 
Plaintiff Classes. This Court granted that motion on October 8, 2008.
(Citations to record and footnote omitted.)
The parties thereafter filed cross-motions for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ 
class claims for injunctive relief under the Rehabilitation Act and § 1983. In addition, 
the City moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim for compensatory damages. 
On July 15, 2009, the district court issued an opinion and order granting partial summary 
judgment in favor of plaintiffs on the Rehabilitation Act and § 1983 claims, denying the 
City’s cross-motion, and permanently enjoining the City from enforcing Directive 3.07 
§ III(H)(1)(c).2 See Lee v. City o f Columbus, Ohio, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (S.D. Ohio 
2009). The City now appeals.3
II.
“A party is entitled to a permanent injunction if it can establish that it suffered 
a constitutional violation and will suffer continuing irreparable injury for which there 
is no adequate remedy at law.” WedgewoodLtd. P ’ship I  v. Twp. o f Liberty, Ohio, 610 
F.3d 340, 349 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In 
determining whether a district court has properly granted a permanent injunction, we 
review factual findings for clear error, legal conclusions de novo, and the scope of
2
The court denied plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion to the extent plaintiffs argued that other 
subsections of Directive 3.07 § III, in addition to Directive 3.07 § III(H)(1)(c), were before the court for 
requested injunctive relief. The district court held that “considering any Directive other than Directive 
3.07 § III(H) would in effect be allowing amendment to the complaint, which will not be permitted at this 
stage of these proceedings.” Having found for plaintiffs on the merits of their claims, the district court 
concluded that defendants’ summary judgment motion pertaining to plaintiffs’ compensatory damages 
claim was moot.
3
The AARP has filed an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiffs, focusing its argument on the 
Rehabilitation Act claim.
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injunctive relief for abuse of discretion.” Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith 
Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 546 (6th Cir. 2005).
“Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the facts and drawing all inferences 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material 
fact for trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Harris v. 
Metro. Gov’t o f Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn, 594 F.3d 476, 482 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)). “The standard of review for cross­
motions for summary judgment does not differ from the standard applied when a motion 
is filed by only one party to the litigation.” Ferro Corp. v. Cookson Group, PLC, 585 
F.3d 946, 949 (6th Cir. 2009).
III.
The Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with 
a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason o f her or his disability, . . . be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (emphasis added). The Rehabilitation Act specifies 
that “ [t]he standards used to determine whether this section has been violated in a 
complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards 
applied under . . . the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [“ADA”] (42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111 et seq.) . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(d); see also Doe v. Salvation Army in the U.S., 
531 F.3d 355, 357 (6th Cir. 2008) (“We review claims brought under the Rehabilitation 
Act as we would claims brought under the [ADA].”); McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. 
Athletic A ss’n, 119 F.3d 453, 459 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (explaining the similarities 
in purpose and scope of the two statutes such that “[t]he analysis of claims under the 
[ADA] roughly parallels those brought under the Rehabilitation Act”) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act both prohibit 
discrimination against the disabled -  but the Rehabilitation Act, unlike the ADA, 
expressly prohibits discrimination solely on the basis of disability.4 See Burns v. City
4
The ADA, on the other hand, proscribes discrimination “on the basis of disability [,]” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(a) (2009) or, before its amendment in 2008, “because of the disability.”
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o f Columbus, D ep’t o f Pub. Safety, 91 F.3d 836, 841-42 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he 
Rehabilitation Act permits an employer to make a decision because o f  a handicap if the 
handicap is not the sole reason for the decision.”).
Thus, to recover on a claim of disability-based discrimination under the 
Rehabilitation Act, an employee must establish that: “ 1) he is an individual with a 
disability; 2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the job requirements, with or without 
reasonable accommodation; and 3) he [suffered an adverse employment action] solely 
by reason of his handicap.” Jones v. Potter, 488 F.3d 397, 403 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Citing McPherson, the district court in the case at hand held that the 
Rehabilitation Act incorporates the limitations on the disclosure of medical information 
contained in the ADA. The ADA provides in relevant part:
A covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not 
make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an 
individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, 
unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and 
consistent with business necessity.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). A “disability” is defined by the ADA as “(A) a physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of 
such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having 
such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006); see also Spees v. James Marine, 
Inc, 617 F.3d 380, 395-96 (6th Cir. 2010).5
Under the category of “Acceptable examinations and inquiries[,]” the ADA 
permits an employer to “make inquiries into the ability of an employee to perform job-
c
related functions.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B). Any information obtained regarding
5
The 2009 amendments to this section do not apply retroactively to this case. See Spees, 617 F.3d
at 396.
c
As we explained in E.E.O.C. v. Prevo’s Family Market, Inc , 135 F.3d 1089 (6th Cir. 1998):
The statute clearly permits medical examinations but only in certain limited 
circumstances. The focus is on the nature of job relatedness and what constitutes a
Case: 09-3899 Document: 006110878283 Filed: 02/23/2011 Page: 8
No. 09-3899 Lee, et al. v. City o f Columbus, Ohio Page 8
the medical condition or history of an employee must be “collected and maintained on 
separate forms and in separate medical files and is treated as a confidential medical 
record, except that -- . . . supervisors and managers may be informed regarding necessary 
restrictions on the work or duties of the employee and necessary accommodations[.]” 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B)(i); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(C).
The district court found that the Rehabilitation Act encompasses these ADA 
provisions because “the limited disclosure protection [provided by these ADA 
provisions] furthers the anti-discrimination thrust of both statutory schemes. The 
restriction on broad disclosure is a protection against undue discrimination of sensitive 
information that could lead to discrimination.” Lee, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 1009. Following 
the lead of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Conroy v. New York State D ep’t o f 
Correctional Services, 333 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2003), the district court held that the City’s 
medical inquiries conducted pursuant to the Directive invoked the ADA’s protections:
The fact that the Directive itself requires “a general diagnoses is 
sufficient to trigger the protections of the ADA under this provision 
[42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)].” Conroy, 333 F.3d at 95 (affirming the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment to plaintiff on this point). See also 
Pennsylvania State Troopers A ss’n v. Miller, 621 F. Supp. 2d 246 (M.D.
Pa. 2008) (holding that universal policy requiring employee to provide 
information on “the nature of the inquiry or illness” was an 
impermissible disability-related inquiry); Transp. Workers Union, Local 
100 v. N.Y. City Transit Auth, 341 F. Supp. 2d 432 (S.D. N.Y. 2004)
(same). [The City’s] argument that it is not in control of the extent or 
accuracy of the diagnoses the treating physician chooses to impart on the 
return to work document is irrelevant to the reasoning behind this 
conclusion. This Court agrees with the Conroy court’s conclusion “that 
since general diagnoses may expose individuals with disabilities to 
employer stereotypes, the Policy implicates the concerns expressed in 
these provisions of the ADA” and, by incorporation the Rehabilitation 
Act. Conroy, 333 F.3d at 95-96.
business necessity. The interpretative guidelines to the ADA explain that the statute 
was intended to prevent against “medical tests and inquiries that do not serve a 
legitimate business purpose.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13(b) App. (1996).
Id. at 1094. See also Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. D ist, 197 F.3d 804, 812 (6th Cir. 1999) (“While it is 
true that the ADA limits an employer’s ability to request unfounded examinations to prevent the unwanted 
exposure of the employee’s disability and stigma it may carry, an employer may order a well-founded 
examination.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id. at 1012.
The district court determined that the Directive’s requirement that the 
confidential medical information be disclosed to immediate supervisors violates 
§ 12112(d)(4)(A), because supervisory personnel in the chain of command are not 
authorized by the statute to have unfettered access to confidential medical information:
The ADA and its implementing rules explicitly provide for disclosure of 
such medical information to a supervisor only in select circumstances, 
and by so expressly limiting disclosure, the statutory scheme implicitly 
forecloses disclosure to supervisors for purposes that fall outside those 
narrow and specific purposes. If the ADA were intended to allow full 
disclosure to a supervisor in all instances, then there would be no need 
for the specific disclosure to a supervisor language. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(d)(3)(B)(i). The city’s view would mean that the explicit 
exception for supervisors was mere surplusage, but there is no basis to 
reach the conclusion that Congress did not intend for the specific 
language concerning supervisors to constitute a substantive provision.
Id. at 1010 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The district court held that the 
Directive was overly intrusive and improperly provided supervisors with confidential 
medical information even when they had no reason to possess such knowledge, 
particularly in light of the fact that the City had a human resources department which 
presumably could be used to create a “confidentiality barrier between these personnel, 
whose jobs consist of handling medical information, and supervisors.” Id. (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Finding that the City otherwise failed to make out the 
affirmative defense of business necessity, the court granted summary judgment and 
permanent injunctive relief to plaintiffs on their Rehabilitation Act claim. Id. at 1013­
15.
As a preliminary matter, we note that the Rehabilitation Act addresses the 
confidentiality of medical records only in the limited context of pre-employment 
examinations. See 28 C.F.R. § 42.513; 24 C.F.R. § 8.13(a). However, we agree with the 
district court and other courts that the ADA’s limitations on the disclosure of medical 
information set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) are incorporated by reference into the 
Rehabilitation Act. See Doe v. U.S. Postal Service, 317 F.3d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
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Scott v. Napolitano, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1082 n.4 (S.D. Cal. 2010); Brady v. Potter, 
No. Civ. 02-1121, 2004 WL 964264, at *4 (D. Minn. April 30, 2004) (unpublished); 
Greer v. O ’Neill, No. 01-1398, 2003 WL 25653036, at *9 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2003) 
(unpublished). Plaintiffs must therefore show that the Directive’s mandate amounted to 
a prohibited inquiry into their medical disability within the meaning of the ADA, 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
Moreover, the district court appropriately determined that plaintiffs are proper 
parties to challenge the Directive. See Lee, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 1011. A plaintiff need 
not prove that he or she has a disability in order to contest an allegedly improper medical 
inquiry under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d). See Harrison v. BenchmarkElecs. Huntsville, Inc, 
593 F.3d 1206, 1214 (11th Cir. 2010) (“ [A] plaintiff has a private right of action under 
[§ 12112(d)], irrespective of his disability status.”); Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 
527 (8th Cir. 2007) (Section 12112(d)(4)(A) “applies to all employees, regardless of 
whether the employee has an actual disability.”); Conroy, 333 F.3d at 94 (and cases cited 
therein) (“ [A] plaintiff need not prove that he or she has a disability unknown to his or 
her employer in order to challenge a medical inquiry or examination under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(d)(4)(a).”); Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conf. Resort, Inc., 124 F.3d 1221, 1229 
(10th Cir. 1997) (“It makes little sense to require an employee to demonstrate that he has 
a disability to prevent his employer from inquiring as to whether or not he has a 
disability.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
However, beyond this point, we part ways with the district court’s analysis, 
which follows the Second Circuit’s holding in Conroy that because an employer’s 
general request for a “diagnosis” upon an employee’s return from sick leave “may tend 
to reveal’ a disability, it therefore constitutes a protected disability-related inquiry under 
§ 12112(d)(4)(A) of the ADA. Conroy, 333 F.3d at 95. Because we find Conroy to be 
distinguishable, the district court’s reliance on this authority is misplaced.
At issue in Conroy was an ADA challenge, under § 12112(d)(4)(A), to a 
correctional-facility sick-leave policy, similar to the Directive in the present case, that 
required employees to submit general diagnoses as part of a medical certification
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procedure following certain absences. Id. at 92. The certification included a brief 
diagnosis that was “sufficiently informative as to allow [the defendant facility] to make 
a determination concerning the employee’s entitlement to leave or to evaluate the need 
to have an employee examined by [the Employee Health Service] prior to returning to 
duty.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; second alteration in original). 
Although certification was not usually required for absences of less than four days, the 
policy indicated that in “exceptional circumstances, a supervisor may exercise the right 
to request certification for any absence charged to sick leave or family sick leave 
regardless of duration.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A second 
related directive stated that “[m]edical certification may be required of any employee 
who requests to charge an absence to sick leave credits[,]” but clarified that only 
“[e]mployees suspected of attendance abuse may be required to furnish medical 
certification for all absences which they seek to charge to sick leave.” Id. (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). Examining this policy, the 
Second Circuit held:
[The defendants] contend[] that requiring medical certification is not an 
“inquiry” prohibited under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). The ADA does 
not forbid all medical inquiries, but only those “as to whether such 
employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity 
of the disability.” Id. [The defendants] argue[] that because the Policy 
only requires a “general” diagnosis, its inquiries are insufficient to reveal 
whether the employee has a disability. [The plaintiff] argues that the 
Policy falls within the statute, because the inquiries would tend to reveal 
an employee’s disability.
* * *
It is clear that even what [defendants] refer[] to as a “general diagnosis” 
may tend to reveal a disability. We hold that requiring a general 
diagnosis is sufficient to trigger the protections of the ADA under this 
provision and that summary judgment in [the plaintiff’ s] favor was 
appropriate on this element.
Few courts have interpreted this provision, but one court has found that 
a requirement that employees disclose what prescription drugs they use 
is a prohibited inquiry, since such a policy would reveal disabilities (or 
perceived disabilities) to employers. See Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain 
Conference Resort, 920 F. Supp. 1153, 1154-55 (D. Colo. 1996), a ff’d  in
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pertinent part, 124 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1997). Similarly, we believe 
that since general diagnoses may expose individuals with disabilities to 
employer stereotypes, the Policy implicates the concerns expressed in 
these provisions of the ADA.
Id. at 95-96. The Conroy court found support for its conclusion in the EEOC’s guide 
published for the purpose of clarifying the application of § 12112(d)(4)(A):
The EEOC’s own definition of a “disability-related inquiry” further 
undercuts [the defendants’] argument:
What is a “disability-related inquiry”? (Question 1)
A “disability-related inquiry” is a question that is likely 
to elicit information about a disability, such as asking 
employees about: whether they have or ever had a 
disability; the kinds of prescription medications they are 
taking; and, the results of any genetic tests they have had.
Disability-related inquiries also include asking an 
employee’s co-worker, family member, or doctor about 
the employee’s disability.
Questions that are not likely to elicit information about a 
disability are always permitted, and they include asking 
employees about their general well-being; whether they 
can perform job functions; and about their current illegal 
use of drugs.
See Questions and Answers: Enforcement Guidance on Disability- 
Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations o f Employees Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), (EEOC, July 2[6], 2000) [EEOC
Notice 915.002, 2000 WL 33407183, at *1 -2 ]___  [The defendants’]
requirement of a general diagnosis is much more akin to the examples of 
prohibited inquiries than to inquiries into general well-being or ability to 
perform job functions.
Id. at 96. The Conroy court therefore concluded that the sick-leave policy at issue 
constituted a prohibited disability-related inquiry under § 12112(d)(4)(A) that must be 
justified by business necessity.7 See also Pennsylvania State Troopers Ass ’n, 621 F.
However, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the defendant’s 
affirmative defense of business necessity, the Conroy court remanded the matter to the district court for 
further proceedings. Id. at 97-102. On remand, the district court found that “[d]efendants have not 
demonstrated that the three-day absence general diagnosis inquiry requirement serves a business necessity” 
and, thus, “as the inquiry does not fall within the exception, and it is an inquiry which violates the ADA,
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Supp. 2d at 252 (“A policy that requires the employee to provide a general diagnosis or 
description of a medical condition constitutes a prohibited inquiry under 
§ 12112(d)(4).”); Transp. Workers Union o f Am., Local 100, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 446 
(following Conroy and holding that “the general diagnosis requirement [is] an inquiry 
within the meaning of the ADA prohibition, because it may tend to reveal a disability”) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Conroy court’s holding in this regard has yet to be followed by any of our 
sister circuits, and we decline to apply it to the present circumstances. First, we do not 
find the requirement that an employee provide a general diagnosis -  or in this case, an 
even less specific statement regarding the “nature” of an employee’s illness -  to be 
tantamount to an inquiry “as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability 
or as to the nature or severity of the disability” under § 12112(d)(4)(A). By painting 
with such a broad brush, and finding suspect any routine or general inquiry simply 
because it “may tend to reveal” an employee’s disability, the Conroy court has 
unnecessarily swept within the statute’s prohibition numerous legitimate and innocuous 
inquiries that are not aimed at identifying a disability. Obviously, asking an employee 
whether he is taking prescription drugs or medication, see Doe, 531 F.3d at 358-59, or 
questions “seek[ing] information about illnesses, mental conditions, or other 
impairments [an employee] has or had in the past[,]” trigger the ADA’s (and hence the 
Rehabilitation Act’s) protections. Scott, 717 F. Supp. 2d at 1084-85. Asking an 
employee returning to work to describe the “nature” of his illness, however, is not 
necessarily a question about whether the employee is disabled.
This is particularly problematic in the present context, which involves a claim 
brought under the Rehabilitation Act, not the ADA. The mere fact that an employer, 
pursuant to a sick leave policy, requests a general diagnosis that may tend to lead to 
information about disabilities falls far short of the requisite proof that the employer is 
discriminating solely on the basis of disability. See, e.g., Verkade v. U.S. Postal Service,
plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment must be granted.” Fountain v. N.Y. State D ep’t o f  Corr. 
Servs., No. 99-CV-389, 2005 WL 1502146, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. June 23, 2005) (unpublished).
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378 F. App’x 567, 578 (6th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (“An employer makes an adverse 
employment decision ‘solely’ because of its employee’s disability when the employer 
has no reason left to rely on to justify its decision other than the employee’s disability.”) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Turner v. City o f Englewood, 195 F. 
App’x 346, 354 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (“Plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie 
case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act because she cannot prove that 
discrimination was the sole motivation for Defendant’s rezoning of her property.”) 
(emphasis added).
In Conroy, the Second Circuit was interpreting the ADA, which does not contain 
language requiring that plaintiffs demonstrate that they have been discriminated against 
“solely by reason” of a disability. The Second Circuit therefore, appropriately, did not 
factor that requirement into its decision. The Rehabilitation Act, in contrast, requires 
that plaintiffs make exactly that showing. Consequently, the analysis in the present 
circumstances should focus on whether a medical inquiry is intended to reveal or 
necessitates revealing a disability, rather than whether the inquiry may merely tend to 
reveal a disability. C f 24 C.F.R. § 8.13(a) (Rehabilitation Act regulation providing that 
“a recipient may not make a preemployment inquiry or conduct a preemployment 
medical examination of an applicant to determine whether the applicant is an individual 
with handicaps or the nature or severity of a handicap.”) (emphasis added).
Here, the generalized and uniform inquiry mandated by the City’s Directive -  
requiring that employees returning from more than three days of sick leave submit a note 
to their immediate supervisor from their doctor stating the “nature of the illness” -  is not 
ipso facto a prohibited inquiry “as to whether [an] employee is an individual with a 
disability,” as “disability” is defined by the ADA. There is no evidence that this inquiry 
is intended to reveal or necessitates revealing a disability. Thus, we conclude that the 
Directive does not trigger the protections of § 12112(d)(4)(A).
Even assuming arguendo that the requirement of the Directive can be 
characterized as a disability-related inquiry, it is not prohibited by the ADA because it
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is a workplace policy applicable to all employees, disabled or not. As the EEOC 
Enforcement Guidance cited by the Conroy court further explains:
May an employer request that an employee provide a doctor’s note 
or other explanation when the employee has used sick leave? 
(Question 15)
Yes. An employer is entitled to know why an employee is requesting 
sick leave. An employer, therefore, may ask an employee to provide a 
doctor’s note or other explanation, as long as it has a policy or practice 
of requiring all employees to do so.
Questions and Answers: Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries and 
Medical Examinations o f Employees under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
2000 WL 33407183, at *4.
The Enforcement Guidance, while non-binding, “constitute[s] a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for 
guidance.” White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 812 (6th Cir. 
2004) (en banc) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also E.E.O.C. v. 
Sundance Rehabilitation Corp, 466 F.3d 490, 500 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[The EEOC’s] 
Enforcement Guidance is entitled to respect only to the extent of its persuasive power.”). 
Here, we find it to be very “persuasive authority.” White, 364 F.3d at 812.
In fact, on the basis of this Guidance, other courts and the EEOC have held that 
an employer’s request for employees to supply information justifying the use of sick 
leave is not an improper medical inquiry under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA. In 
White v. Potter, EEOC Dec. 01A14266, 2002 WL 31440931 (Oct. 23, 2002), the EEOC 
rejected the employee’s claim that he was discriminated against on the basis of age, 
where the employer placed him on leave without pay for failing to provide the required 
leave documentation, holding:
While not raised by the parties, we take this opportunity to point out that 
there is no evidence that the agency’s actions constituted an improper 
medical inquiry under Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of1973 . . . . 
Commission guidance makes clear that an employer may ask an 
employee to justify his/her use of sick leave by providing a doctor’s note
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or other explanation, as long as it has a policy or practice requiring all
employees, with or without disabilities to do so.
2002 WL 31440931, at *4 n.2.
Similarly, in Donoghue v. Nicholson, EEOC Dec. 0120063441, 2007 WL 
2907575 (Sept. 26, 2007), the EEOC rejected the complainant’s claim under the 
Rehabilitation Act that her employer failed to accommodate her disability by retracting 
previously approved sick leave and denying her leave request, finding that “[e]ven if 
complainant verbally informed her supervisor that she needed the leave because of a 
medical test, complainant’s supervisor was entitled to request reasonable medical 
documentation^]” which was never provided by the complainant. 2007 WL 2907575, 
at *4 (citing EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries, Notice 
915.002, at question 15). See also 5 C.F.R. § 630.405 (requiring certain federal 
employees to provide “administratively acceptable evidence or medical certification” for 
a sick-leave absence).
In McGill v. Munoz, 203 F.3d 843, 847-48 (D.C. Cir. 2000), an action brought 
under the Rehabilitation Act, the court held that evidence that a federal agency 
discriminated against an employee on the basis of her depression by requiring her to 
provide a doctor’s note for requested sick leave was insufficient for submission to a jury, 
where the requirement “complied with the written sick leave policy” and there was no 
evidence that employees with similarly suspicious patterns of absenteeism were treated 
differently. See also Ogawa v. Henderson, 10 F. App’x 587, 588 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(unpublished) (holding that postal carrier, who suffered an on-the-job injury, failed to 
establish that he was terminated solely on the basis of his disability, as required by the 
Rehabilitation Act, where “ [t]he USPS based its termination . . . on his failure to provide 
medical documentation after each absence, as required by its sick leave policy. 
Employers may terminate otherwise disabled individuals who violate company rules.”); 
Luther v. Gutierrez, 618 F. Supp. 2d 483, 493 (E.D. Va. 2009) (holding that terminated 
employee, who failed to follow supervisory instructions, failed to follow sick-leave 
procedures, and was repeatedly absent without leave, failed to establish a prima facie
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case of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act: “ [T]he Rehabilitation Act 
does not serve to immunize a disabled employee from discipline in the workplace based 
on a violation of a valid work rule applied to all employees.”) (citing Pernice v. City o f  
Chicago, 237 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2001)); Montano v. INOVA Health Care Servs., 
No. 1:08cv565, 2008 WL 4905982, at *7 (E.D. Va. Nov. 12, 2008) (unpublished) 
(holding that the employer’s inquiry into the reason for the plaintiff’ s medical leave was 
not a disability-related inquiry protected by ADA); Bosse v. Chertoff No. CV 07-12-H- 
CCL, 2008 WL 906019, at *10 (D. Mont. March 21, 2008) (rejecting employee’s claim 
of disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act where the employer “tried to 
work with [the plaintiff] and required only that he followed prescribed paperwork and 
procedures for using sick leave[,]” but the plaintiff “adamantly refused to follow these 
. . . procedures” and “refused to provide the [employer] with the medical certificates 
substantiating his illnesses”); Miller v. Donley, EEOC Dec. 0120082055, 2010 WL 
4388416, at *4 (Oct. 26, 2010) (rejecting the complainant’s Rehabilitation Act 
discrimination claim based upon the employer’s issuance of a letter of absence because 
the record showed that the agency legitimately issued the letter “after Complainant had 
been off for weeks and did not submit the documentation required for extended leave in 
the form the Agency required[,]” and the agency reversed the denial of sick leave once 
the complainant “submitted documentation that the agency found adequate”).
In the present case, the City’s Directive is a universal sick-leave policy 
applicable across the board to all Division employees, disabled or not, who use 
contractual sick leave for a personal illness of more than three days or a family illness 
of more than two days, as well as those employees who are on a sick-leave verification 
list. Consistent with the above authorities, it constitutes a valid and acceptable inquiry 
under § 12112(d)(4)(A).
In granting plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief, the district court reluctantly 
acknowledged the legitimacy of such sick-leave policies, Lee, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 1009, 
but nevertheless enjoined enforcement of the Directive, concluding that it is 
impermissible “to require an employee to give the note or slip containing his or her
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medical diagnosis to his or her immediate supervisor, when the Division of Police 
maintains a human resources department.” Id. at 1010. The court reasoned:
The only disclosure to a supervisor that is necessary or permissible is that 
information that targets necessary restrictions or accommodations for an 
employee [under § 12112(d)(3)(B)(i) and (4)C)]. . . .
Supervisors, who are not fungible in this case with human resource 
personnel, are on a need-to-know basis, and the directive at issue 
improperly provides supervisors with otherwise confidential medical 
information even when they have no reason to possess such knowledge.
Id. at 1013 (citation omitted). The district court stated: “Of course, not every employer 
will have human resources personnel. The City of Columbus does, however, which 
creates a distinction and a confidentiality barrier between these personnel, whose jobs 
consist of handling medical information, and supervisors.” Lee, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 1010 
(citation omitted).
The district court has created an artificial distinction where none exists. It is not 
within the province of the courts to rewrite legislation, superimpose language onto 
statutes, or “act as super personnel departments to second guess an employer’s facially 
legitimate business decisions.” Adams v. Tenn. D ep’t o f Fin. and Admin, 179 F. App’x 
266, 272 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
There is no language in either the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA that, with regard to the 
processing of medical inquiries, differentiates between employers based on the size or 
organizational structure of the work force or the existence of a separate human resources 
department. The ADA clearly permits an employer, including by express definition a 
supervisor (as an “agent” of the employer), to make inquiries and receive medical 
information in accordance with § 12112(d). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(2) and (5)(A). 
Nothing in § 12112(d) prohibits the City from designating an employee’s immediate 
supervisor as the initial contact for purposes of administering its sick leave benefits.
The confidentiality provisions set forth in § 12112(3)(B)(i), cited by the district 
court, “protect disabled employees from job discrimination by ensuring that the results 
of job-related medical examinations would not be kept in their personnel files. The
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statute goes no further than requiring employers to keep that limited class of medical 
records confidential[.]” Yoder v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 31 F. Supp. 2d 565, 569 (N.D. 
Ohio 1997), a ff’d, 172 F.3d 51 (6th Cir. 1998) (table). Section 12112(3)(B)(i) neither 
expressly nor implicitly restricts the role of supervisory personnel in receiving and 
processing an employee’s medical information.
Plaintiffs have no basis to challenge the Directive based on unwarranted 
speculation that supervisors will disobey the statute’s confidentiality strictures or the 
City’s Directive. Supervisors are obligated to follow the City’s rules and policies, which 
include an express prohibition against discrimination on the basis of disability and 
disclosure of confidential medical information. Division policy prohibits supervisors 
from sharing or disseminating doctors’ notes or any confidential information contained 
therein.
As the City points out, the legitimacy of sick-leave policies that require 
employees returning from leave to provide medical information to supervisors is 
demonstrated by the sick-leave policy for employees of the EEOC, which essentially 
mirrors the Directive. The EEOC’s own policy provides that “[t]he approval of sick 
leave is a responsibility of the supervisor,” who “shall determine that . . . medical 
documentation submitted by the employee . . . supports charging the absence to sick 
leave.” The EEOC also recognizes that in the context of disability requests, which 
would likely entail medical information of a more serious nature than a doctor’s note 
furnished for occasional sick leave, that it is appropriate for first-line supervisors to 
review and approve ADA accommodation requests in the first instance: “To eliminate 
unnecessary levels of review, agencies should authorize first-line supervisors to approve 
requests for reasonable accommodation wherever possible.” Policy Guidance on 
Executive Order 13164: Establishing Procedures To Facilitate The Provision o f  
Reasonable Accommodation, No. 915.002, 2000 WL 33407185, at *6 (Oct. 20, 2000) 
(emphasis omitted).
In sum, we hold that the City’s Directive comports with the Rehabilitation Act 
and does not violate the proscriptions pertaining to disability-related inquiries set forth
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in § 12112(d)(4)(A) of the ADA, incorporated by reference into the Rehabilitation Act. 
Because the City’s implementation of the Directive does not constitute an adverse 
employment action, plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case of disability 
discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. See Jones, 488 F3d at 404. “Generally, at 
the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff’ s burden is merely to present evidence from 
which a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff suffered an adverse 
employment action under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful 
discrimination.” Macy v. Hopkins Cnty. Sch. Bd. o f Educ., 484 F.3d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 
2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In the present circumstances, 
plaintiffs have not carried their burden. See James v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 354 
F. App’x 246, 249 (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (holding that an employer’s valid 
demand for a medical examination “cannot constitute an adverse employment action in 
general discrimination claims” under the ADA).
For these reasons, we vacate the injunction and reverse the district court’s 
judgment in favor of plaintiffs on the Rehabilitation Act claim and remand with 
instructions that the district court enter judgment in favor of the City.
IV.
The district court also denied the City’s summary judgment motion and granted 
summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
alleging that implementation of Directive 3.07 § III(H)(1)(c) and the disclosure of their 
personal medical information to immediate supervisors violates their privacy rights 
protected by the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. The court concluded “that Directive 3.07 § III(H)(1)(c) ‘encompasses 
unwarranted intrusion into all areas of an employee’s personal medical information 
without a sufficiently exculpatory animus’ and, therefore, violates the privacy provisions 
found in the United States Constitution.” We disagree.
“The Sixth Circuit . . . has developed and applied a different approach to 
assessing informational privacy claims” that “requires that the asserted privacy interest
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implicate a fundamental right.” Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 442 (6th Cir. 2008).
As we explained in Lambert:
Two types of interests have been identified by the Supreme Court as 
protected by the right to privacy that is rooted in the substantive due 
process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. One is the interest in 
“independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.” Whalen 
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 & n.26 (1977) (noting that these decisions 
have been characterized as dealing with “matters relating to procreation, 
marriage, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and 
education” (quoting Paulv. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)). The other 
type of privacy interest applicable to individuals is the “interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” Id. at 599, 603-04 (recognizing 
that a statute requiring that the state be provided with a copy of certain 
drug prescriptions implicated the individual’s interest in non-disclosure, 
but upholding the law because the statute contained adequate security 
measures); Nixon v. Adm ’r o f Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 465 (1977) 
(assuming that President Nixon had a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in his private communications, but upholding a federal law that provided 
for the review and classification of presidential materials by professional 
archivists). Lambert’s claim implicates the latter interest, which this 
court has described as “an individual’s right to control the nature and 
extent of information released about that individual” and that “has been 
coined an informational right to privacy.” Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673,
683 (6th Cir. 1998).
This court, in contrast to some of our sister circuits, “has narrowly 
construed the holdings of Whalen and Nixon to extend the right to 
informational privacy only to interests that implicate a fundamental 
liberty interest.” Id. at 684. A plaintiff alleging a violation of her right 
to informational privacy must therefore demonstrate that “the interest at 
stake relates to ‘those personal rights that can be deemed fundamental or 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Id. (quoting J.P. v. DeSanti,
653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981)). Only after a fundamental right is 
identified should the court proceed to the next step of the analysis -  the 
balancing of the government’s interest in disseminating the information 
against the individual’s interest in keeping the information private. See 
Kallstrom [v. City o f Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1061 (6th Cir. 1998)]
(“This circuit . . . will only balance an individual’s interest in 
nondisclosure . . . against the public’s interest in and need for the 
invasion of privacy where the individual privacy interest is of 
constitutional dimension.”).
Applying these standards, this court has recognized an informational- 
privacy interest o f constitutional dimension in only two instances:
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(1) where the release o f personal information could lead to bodily harm 
(Kallstrom), and (2) where the information released was o f a sexual, 
personal, and humiliating nature (Bloch).
Lambert, 517 F.3d at 440 (emphasis added). See also Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 
429 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Sixth Circuit has held that the Constitution does not 
encompass a general right to nondisclosure of private information. Instead, the Sixth 
Circuit has continued to restrict the right of privacy to those rights that can be deemed 
‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted); Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 
566, 574 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Since DeSanti, this Court has not strayed from its holding, 
and continues to evaluate privacy claims based on whether the interest sought to be 
protected is a fundamental interest or an interest implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.”).8
With regard to the dissemination of medical information, we have acknowledged 
that “a person possesses no reasonable expectation that his medical history will remain 
completely confidential^] [t]his is not to say that a person has no interest in protecting, 
to some extent, the confidentiality of his medical records.” In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 
641 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606-07). However, under our 
interpretation of privacy rights, we have not yet confronted circumstances involving the 
disclosure of medical records that, in our view, are tantamount to the breach of a 
“fundamental liberty interest” under the Constitution. See, e.g., Summe v. Kenton Cnty. 
Clerk’s Office, 604 F.3d 257, 270-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (county’s release of medical record
8
Whether a broader right to nondisclosure of private information even exists remains an open 
question under the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence, NASA v. Nelson, 131 S.Ct. 746 (2011). In 
NASA, the Court was confronted by the claims of government contractors that certain aspects of a 
background investigation violated their right to privacy. Id. at 751. Looking back to past cases, the Court 
noted that since the “waning days of the October Term 1976[,]” it has said “little else on the subject of an 
‘individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.’” Id. at 756. In NASA, just as in Whalen, 
the Court then declined to address whether the right existed, and instead, assumed, without deciding, that 
the right existed. Id. at 757; see also id. at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court’s decision not 
to reach the question of whether the right exists and explaining that a right to “informational privacy” does 
not exist). Without any hint of approval for one approach over another, the Court also acknowledged the 
existence of “a number of different interpretations of Whalen and Nixon over the years[,]” including our 
Circuit’s interpretation of the cases. Id. at 756 n.9 (collecting cases from several circuits, including J.P. 
v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981)). Thus, the Court has not provided us with any reason 
to take the opportunity to revisit our past precedents on this matter.
Case: 09-3899 Document: 006110878283 Filed: 02/23/2011 Page: 23
No. 09-3899 Lee, et al. v. City o f Columbus, Ohio Page 23
of deputy county clerk to citizen pursuant to open records request did not implicate a 
right fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty so as to violate 
constitutional right to privacy); Wilson, 517 F.3d at 428-29 (state prisoner who brought 
a § 1983 action did not have a fundamental privacy interest in the information contained 
in his DNA profile retained in state and national DNA-indexing systems); Jarvis v. 
Wellman, 52 F.3d 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1995) (disclosure of rape victim’s medical records 
to an inmate by prison officials “does not rise to the level of a breach of a right 
recognized as ‘fundamental’ under the Constitution” so as to state cognizable § 1983 
action); In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 642 (affirming the enforcement of a subpoena duces 
tecum issued by a grand jury, commanding psychotherapists to produce patient 
information); Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1539 (6th Cir. 1987) (city ordinance 
that required employees on sick leave for more than thirty days to complete a form 
providing the City with medical information was legitimate request and did not invade 
former employee’s right to privacy); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Dir. o f N at’l Inst. for  
Occupational Safety, 636 F.2d 163, 165-66 (6th Cir. 1980) (enforcement of a subpoena 
issued by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health for the production 
of medical records of automaker’s employees, in conjunction with research on 
workplace health hazards, did not intrude upon protected privacy interests, where 
safeguards against the improper disclosure of the confidential information could be 
implemented).
The present case is no different. Directive 3.07 § III(H)(1)(c), which requires an 
employee returning from sick leave to provide to the immediate supervisor a physician’s 
note stating the “nature of the illness,” does not implicate the preservation of life and 
personal security interests recognized in Kallstrom, or the interest in shielding sexuality 
and choices about sex, protected in Bloch. In short, it does not raise an informational- 
privacy concern of a constitutional dimension.
Moreover, as we have already noted, plaintiffs have no basis to challenge the 
Directive based on unwarranted speculation that their immediate supervisors will 
disobey it. Supervisors are obligated to follow the City’s policies, which include express
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prohibitions against the disclosure of confidential information. See Wilson, 517 F.3d at 
430 (“The hypothetical possibility of some future abuse does not substantiate a 
justiciable controversy.”).
The district court therefore erred in entering judgment in favor of plaintiffs on 
their § 1983 claim and in denying defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
V.
For these reasons, we vacate the injunction and reverse and remand for the entry 
of a judgment in favor of the City on plaintiffs’ claims brought under the Rehabilitation 
Act and § 1983.
